Arthur 0. Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher & Associates, A Utah Corporation : Amicus Brief, Utah Chapter of The Consulting Engineers Council by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1969
Arthur 0. Nauman v. Harold K. Beecher &
Associates, A Utah Corporation : Amicus Brief,
Utah Chapter of The Consulting Engineers
Council
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors. Bryce E. Roe; Attorney for Amicus Curiae
This Brief of Amicus Curiae is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah
Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Amicus Curiae, Nauman v. Beecher, No. 11579 (Utah Supreme Court, 1969).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/163
1 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND ASSO-
CIATES, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and AppeUamt. 
Civil No. 
11579 
Brief of A.miens Curiae on behalf of 
the Utah Chapter of the 
Consulting Engineers wuncil 
VanCott Bagley, Cornwall 
& McCarthy 
Robert M. Anderson 
Robert D. Merrill 
C: I Amicus Curiae 
:J l f::i41 East First South 
:;1 ~ ,, C S~e City, Utah 84111 
·--- -~ - ' ,.J - J 96 0 T'-/.ione : 328-8711 
'-.' ... ,,.1, s . ""' 
... lJ.l"Jrv;,~- · r,---... __ 
-.: .. :;~ 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
REASON FOR INTERCESSION -------------------------------------------------- 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
POINT I. THE ARCHITECTS HAD NO DUTY CRE-
ATED BY CONTRACT OR CUSTOM TO PRE-
SCRIBE OR TO INTERFERE WITH THE 
CONTRACTOR'S METHODS OF DOING HIS 
WORK. ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 2 
POINT II. PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IN 
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION.------------------------ 10 
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 16 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
CASES CITED 
Cagne v. Bertram, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954)______________ 7 
Chesin Construction Co. v. Epstein, 8 Ariz. App. 312, 446 
p .2d 11 ( 1968) -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 5 
Cook v. Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 
( 1963) ------ ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 14 
Gallegos v. Stringham, 21Utah2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968) ________ 15 
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 
A.2d 69 ( 1960) ------------------------------------------------------------------------ 7 
Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 (1957)__________ 9 
James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068 (1911)______________ 9 
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 (1959)________ 9 
Moore v. Phillips, 197 Ark. 131, 120 S.W. 2d 722 (1938)____________ 5 
Neuman v. Beecher, 19 Utah 2d 101, 426 P.2d 621 (1967)______ 3 
Paxton v. Alameda County, 259 P.2d 934 (Cal. App. 1953)____ 8 
STATUTES 
35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated (1953) -------------------------------------------- 11 
35-1-60 Utah Code Annotated (1953) ------------------------------------------ 10 
35-1-42 Utah Code Annotated (1953) -------------------------------------------- 13 
10-8-5 Utah Code Annotated (1953) ------------------------------------------ 14 
TEXTS 
5 Am. Jur. 2d, Architects, §9------------------------------------------------------------ 8 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND ASSO-
CIATES, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Civil No. 
11579 
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE 
The Amicus Curiae files this brief pursuant to per-
mission and order of the Court. Amicus Curiae repre-
sents the Consulting Engineers Council which is a pro-
fessional organization comprised of those engineers who 
engage in the profession of designing component parts 
of structures and reviewing their installation. 
1 
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REASON FOR INTERCESSION 
Consulting engineers engage in a profession similar 
to architects in that they, by contract and custom, also 
have a definite role in connection with the planning and 
drawing of specifications for structures, and reviewing 
the progress of the construction. Hence, the decision of 
this Court and the District Court in this case vitally 
affects all consulting engineers who, similar to architects, 
perform design services pursuant to contract. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Amicus Curiae in behalf of the Consulting Engineers 
Council accepts the statement of facts summarized by 
the Appellant in its brief. 
I. 
THE ARCHITECTS HAD NO DUTY CREATED 
BY CONTRACT OR CUSTOM TO PRESCRIBE OR TO 
INTERFER WITH THE CONTRACTOR'S METHODS 
OF DOING HIS WORK. 
An architect is a professional whose specialized role 
is to design a structure and insure that it is built accord-
ing to his plans. The contractor whose bid is accepted 
to build the structure also has a responsibility to insure 
that his work is done according to the architect's plans. 
However, the contractor has an important prerogative 
of choosing among various construction methods in com-
2 
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plying with the architect's plans. If the architect inter-
feres with these methods, then the basis upon which the 
contractor submitted his bid is altered, and the con-
tractor may lose money. 
This court recognized the above principle when the 
parties to this action were before the Court on another 
issue: 
"The method of construction was a matter 
solely under the control of the contractor, and the 
defendant [architect] had no right to interfere 
with the contractor's execution of the work, ... " 
Nauman v. Beecher, 19 Utah 2d. 101, 426 P2d 621 
(1967). 
The agreement between the architect and the City-
County (Ex. P-1) (R. 520) provided that the architect 
furnish a qualified on-site inspector to supervise and in-
spect all phases of the work being done. The pertinent 
portion of that agreement follows: 
"7. General Administration. The Architect 
shall furnish at his expense a qualified on-site in-. 
spector, acceptable to both Owner and Architect, 
during the entire time the construction work is in 
progress, whose duties shall consist of checking 
all shop drawings, for approval of the City En-
gineer, to determine the quality and acceptance 
of the material and/or equipment proposed to be 
used in the facilities being constructed; to super-
vise and inspect all phases of the work being done. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The above quoted language is phrased in general 
terms onlY and must not be giYen an interpretation re-
. ' 
3 
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quiring architects to supervise daily work methods, tech-
niques, and safety measures. The supervision contem-
plated pertains to construction in compliance with the 
plans and specifications and does not extend to matters 
of health, safety or economics. 
The architect in preparing plans for the Metropoli-
tan Hall of Justice Complex included a utility tunnel 
extending from the Complex to the old City and County 
Building located across the street. It was during excava-
tion for the untility tunnel that the accident occurred 
giving rise to this suit. The architect's plans did not 
show how the utility tunnel was to be installed. (R. 952); 
the methods and means of construction were stirctly the 
responsibility of the contractor. (R-773). In fact, it is 
conceivable that the contractor could have decided to 
burrow instead of trench. The architect does not deter-
mine the method of executing the work and therefore 
should not be responsible for injuries resulting from al-
leged unsafe methods utilized by the contractor. To re-
quire otherwise will bring chaos to contstruction "plan-
ners," architects and engineers and impose upon them 
the role of being an absolute insurer. 
The language in the agreement between the City-
County and the architect requiring the architect to 
"supervise and inspect" the work is similar to provi-
sions in contracts between general contractors and sub-
contractors requiring general contractors to supervise 
the work of a subcontractor. Many cases have considered 
the analogous situation where an employee of a subcon-
4 
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tractor brings suit against a general contractor for neg-
ligence in supervising and allowing an unsafe condition 
to exist. The recent case of Chesin Construction Co. v. 
Epstein, 8 Ariz. App. 312, 44G P.2d 11 (1968) is typical. 
In that case, an employee of a subcontractor sued the 
general contractor for negligent supervision. The Court 
held that the subcontract provision that all work be done 
under direct supervision of the contractor's represent-
ative did not constitute evidence of retained control suf-
ficient to impose liability on the ground of failure of the 
general contractor to properly supervise the subcon-
tractor's work procedures. 
The Chesin case found it was not uncommon for a 
general contractor to provide in a subcontract for a right 
of supervision, and that such a proviso does not destroy 
the normal shield from liability. Chesin quotes the case 
of 111 oore v. Phillips, 197 Ark. 131, 120 S.W. 2d 722 
(1938), 446 P. 2d at 14-15: 
"There are countless decisions of appellate 
courts construing stipulations in contracts, such 
as here involved, relating to the right of the owner 
'to give directions'-'orders' and 'instructions' re-
garding the work as it progresses; and phrases 
such as 'in accordance with instructions'-'as di-
rected'-'under supervision of owner's agent, as 
he may direct'-and 'under the direction and 
supervision', are frequently construed. In all of 
the cases examined, some of which are cited, it is 
held that such phrases do not relate to the method 
of manner and do not govern the details or the 
physical means by which the work is to be per-
formed. The Supreme Court of the United States 
5 
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has so held in two cases directly in point. Case-
ment v. Brown, 148 U.S. 615, 13 S.Ct. 672, 37 L.Ed. 
582; United States v. Driscoll 96 U.S. 421, 24 L.Ed. 
847." 120 S.W. 2d at 727. 
More recent decisions adopt this same view: 
Wallach v. United States, 291 F.2d 69 (2d Cir. 
1961); Gallagher v. United States lines Co., 206. 
F.2d 177 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied 346 U.S. 897, 
74 S.Ct. 221, 98 L.Ed. 398 (1953); Walker v. Wit-
tenberg, Delony & Davidson, Inc., 241 Ark. 525, 
412 S.W.2d 621 (1966), on rehearing 242 Ark. 97, 
412 S.W.2d 621, 626 (1967); Bedford v. Bechtel 
Corp., 172 Cal.App.2d 401, 342 P.2d 495 (1959); 
Potter v. City of Kenosha, 268 Wis. 36_h 68 N.W. 
2d 4 (1955)." (Emphasis added.) 
The language used in the instant agreement-"to 
supervise and inspect all phases of the work being done" 
-is clearly similar in meaning to the phrases dealt with 
in Chesin. This language did not require the architect to 
inspect safety practices during each phase of the con-
struction project. 
The agreement made by the architect provided for 
professional services of a specialized nature. The con-
tract to supervise did not include an implied warranty ' 
to insure the safety of all employees of the contractor 
and each subcontractor. The supervision ref erred to in 
the agreement in the instant case pertains only to con-
struction in accordance with the plans and specifications. 
Some situations may require recovery for personal 
injuries despite the lack of a contractual basis. Such a 
situation is that of a manufacturer's liability for injuries 
6 
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caused by his products without regard to privity of con-
tract or negligence. See the landmark case of Henningsen 
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc. 32 N.J. 358, 161 A2d. 69 
( 1960). However, a professional service, such as archi-
tecture or engineering, does not lend itself to a doctrine 
of liability without fault because it lacks the elements 
that give rise to the doctrine, such as mass advertising 
and production, or distant consumers. Justice Traynor 
recognized this distinction in Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal.2d 
481, 275 P.2d 15, 20-21 (1954): 
"The general rule is applicable that those 
who sell their services for the guidance of others 
in their economic, financial and personal affairs 
are not liable in the absence of negligence or in-
tentional misconduct .... 
The services of experts are sought because 
of their special skill. They have a duty to exercise 
the ordinary skill and competence of members of 
their profession, and a failure to discharge that 
duty will subject them to liability for negligence. 
Those who hire [experts] ... are not justified in 
expecting infallibility, but can expect only reason-
able care and competence. They purchase service, 
not insurance. (Emphasis added.) 
Therefore, the test for liability in this case is based on 
the neg.Zigence of the architect, not a breach of a con-
tractual duty. 
In determining the standard of care owed to third 
parties by an architect, the same test is applied as with 
doctors and lawyers. An architect holds himself out as 
an expert in his particular line of work and is employed 
7 
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because he is believed to be such. See 5 Am. Jur. 2d, 
Architects, §9. 
In Paxton v. Alameda County, 259 P.2d 934, (Cal. 
App. 1953), an architect was sued for negligence in de-
signing a building. The Court approved the following in-
sfruction which represents the prevailing law: 
"By undertaking professional service to a 
client, an architect impliedly represents that he 
possesses, and it is his duty to posses, that degree 
of learning and skill ordinarily possessed by archi-
tects of good standing, practicing the same lo-
cality. It is his further duty to use the care or-
dinarily exercised in like cases by reputable mem-
bers of his profession practicing in the same lo-
cality; to use reasonable diligence and his best 
judgment in the exercise of his skill and the ap-
plication of his learning in an effort to accom-
plish the purpose or which he is employed ... In 
determining whether the defendants architects' 
learning, skill and conduct fulfilled the duties im-
posed by law, as they have been stated to you, 
you are not permitted to set up arbitrarily a stan-' 
dard of your own. The standard is that set by the 
learning, skill and care ordinarily possessed and 
practiced by others of the same profession in the 
same locality, at the same time." (Emphasis add-
ed.) 
It is submitted that the above instruction applies equally 
well to an architect performing his professional duties 
by supervising the construction. 
Utah has consistently held that professional opinion 
is necessary to determine whether an expert, such as a 
doctor, exercised reasonable care and skill usually exer-
8 
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cised by other experts in the same community. See. e.g. 
Marsh v. Pemberton, 10 Utah 2d 40, 347 P.2d 1108 
(1959); Huggins v. Hicken, 6 Utah 2d 233, 310 P.2d 523 
(1957). However, an obvious breach of due care by a 
professional requires no expert testimony to establish 
negligence. James v. Robertson, 39 Utah 414, 117 P. 1068 
( 1911). There was no evidence of such breach of due care 
in this case. 
In the instant case, four architects including the de-
fendant's president, testified the excavation appeared 
safe. (See R-723, R-751, R-831, R-844, R-914, R-986.) No 
architect testified that the excavation was unsafe. In ad-
dition, the plaintiff testified that he thought the excava-
tion was safe (R-692). Also the operator of the drag 
line, and who assisted in the removal of Mr. Nauman 
after the accident (R-891), and the project manager for 
the general contractor (R-803), testified that the excava-
tion was safe. Hence, it must be concluded that the ex-
cavation was not obviously unsafe, and that the standard 
of care of the defendant must have been reasonable be-
cause no other architects in the community testified that 
the excavation was unsafe. The evidence only supports 
the conclusion that the defendant was not negligent. 
If this Court affirms the lower court result on the 
basis that the architect had a duty based on the contract 
provisions to supervise work, including safety aspects, 
architects will be forced to become insurers of construc-
tion site safety standards whenever they enter into an 
architectural contract which includes a proviso for super-
v1s10n. Hence, construction workers on projects designed 
9 
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by an architect or engineer will have a bonus "insurance 
policy" in addition to workmen's compensation. 
There is no basis for affirming the architect's lia-
bility on the provisions of the contract. The general re-
quirement for supervising the construction was a pro-
fessional service owed to the owner for the purpose of 
insuring that the construction proceeded in compliance 
with the architectual drawings. This "supervision" can-
not be interpreted as establishing a duty to supervise and 
insure the safe conduct of all phases of the construction. 
The duty owed by the architect in this case is solely one 
of his duty as a professional. 
II. 
PLAINTIFF'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY IS WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION. 
The plaintiff has received and is receiving work-
men's compensation benefits. This is his exclusive 
remedy against the employer-or any employee or agent 
of the employer-for injuries sustained. Section 35-1-60, 
Utah Code Annotated, (1953). However, he has filed suit 
against defendant alleging the workmen's compensation 
statutes do not preclude such action because the def en-
dant is not in the same employment as plaintiff. It is 
submitted that plaintiff's position cannot be justified. He 
bases the architect's liability on the very grounds that 
workmen's compensation benefits are based - that is, 
"same employment." It is recognized by all that the 
architect was required to be at the construction site for 
10 
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the same reason the plaintiff was there; they were· both 
employees of the City-County. Workmen's compensation 
statntes have established the exclusive remedy for such 
injuries. Section 35-1-62, Utah Code Annotated (1953) 
provides in part: 
"Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts 
of third parties-Reniedies of employee-Rights 
of employer or insitrance carrier in cause of ac-
tio11r-Maintenance of action----Disbursement of 
proceeds of rccovery.-When an injury or death 
for which compensation is payable under this 
title shall have been caused by the wrongful act 
or neglect of another person not in the same em-
ployment, the injured employee, or in case o.f 
death his dependents, may claim compensation 
and the injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representative may also have an action for dam-
ages against such third person ... " (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is submitted that both the defendant and plaintiff were 
in the same employment and the above cited statute bars 
this action by the plaintiff. 
The City-County employed the architect to design the 
Metropolitan Hall of Justice and Jail Complex and super-
vise its construction in accordance with the design. (See 
Ex. P-1) He ·was an agent of the city-county. (See Paxton 
v. Alameda County, sitpra, at 946.) This clearly requires 
that the architect \Vork closely with the contractor, sub-
contractors and individual workers at the Complex. By 
separate contract, the City-County employed the con-
tractor to build the Complex, and required the contractor 
to follow certain directiYes of the architect. (See Ex. P-2) 
11 
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The City-County, through these contracts with the 
architect and the contractor, employed each of them to 
work on the joint project. By these same contracts, the 
City supervised and retained control over them and their 
employees. For example, the City Engineer represented 
the City-County and had control over the architect pur-
suant to paragraph 13 of contract between City-County 
and the architect (Ex. P-1): 
"13. SUPERVISION. The City Engineer 
will represent the Owner, Salt Lake City Corpora-
tion, with respect to this agreement, and the Archi-
tect shall perform and conduct all required serv-
ices under his direction and supervision and shall 
submit his reports of study, drawings, design, de-
tails, specifications and reco1mnendations to him 
for City approval, as well as all shop drawings, 
change orders, estimates for payment to Contrac-
tor as required." 
Likewise, the City-County exercised extensive control 
over the contractor pursuant to paragraph 12a of contract 
between the City-County and the contractor (Ex. P-2): 
"12a. If, in the judgment of the Architect 
and/or the City Engineer or County Engineer, it 
is necessary to close down the work due to in-
clement weather or due to other circumstances 
arising during the progress of the work, that may 
be construed to be dangerous or that may be 
caused by non-compliance with the specifications, 
the Contractor shall comply and he shall stop all 
operations upon written notice from the Architect 
and/or City Engineer or County Engineer so to 
do, and the work shall remain closed down until 
further orders in writing are given by said Archi-
tect and/or City Engineer or County Engineer to 
12 
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the contractor to proceed with the work of this 
project, and there shall be no claim against either 
Salt Lake City Corporation or Salt Lake County, 
or the Architect or Engineers, for such action." 
The City-County appointed a project engineer to 
represent its interests at the Complex site (R-9'54). Both 
the architect and the contractor reported to the City-
County representative and made no changes or revisions 
without his approval. 
Section 35-1-42, Utah Code Annotated (1953), defines 
employers for the purpose of the ·workmen's Compensa-
tion Act. In pertinent part it states: 
35-1-42. Employers enumerated and defined 
-Re gitlarly employed-Independent contractors. 
-The following shall constitute employers sub-
ject to the provisions of this title: 
(1) The state, and each county, city, town 
and school district therein. 
(2) Every person, firm and private corpora-
tion, including every public utility, having in serv-
ice one or more workmen or operatives regularly 
under contract of hire, express or implied, oral or 
written ... 
·where any employer procures any work to 
be done wholly or in part for him by a contractor 
over whose work he retains supervision or control, 
and such work is a part or process in the trade or 
business of the employer, such contractor, and all 
persons employed by any such subcontractors, 
shall be deemed, within the meaning of this section, 
emplo~·ees of snch original employer. Any person, 
firm or corporation engaged in the performance 
of work as an independent contractor shall be 
13 
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deemed an employer within the meaning of this 
section. The term 'independent contractor,' as 
herein used, is defined to be any person, associa-
tion or corporation engaged in the performance of 
any work for another, who, while so engaged, is 
independent of the employer in all that pertains 
to the execution of the work, is not subject to the 
rule or control of the employer, is engaged only in 
the performance of a definite job or piece of work, 
and is subordinate to the employer only in effect-
ing a result in accordance with the employer's de-
sign." 
The work of erecting a City-County Complex is "a 
part or process" in the business of the Employer-City, as 
required by the above-quoted statute. Section 10-8-5, Utah 
Code Annotated (1953) dealing with the powers and of all 
cities says: 
"10-8-5. Erection and Care of Buildings. 
They may erect all needful buildings for the use of 
the city, and provide for their care." 
Both the plaintiff and the architect must be consider-
ed as working on the same general project toward the 
joint goal of completion. They were not strangers, but 
rather were co-workers jointly engaged in the same en-
deavor, both subject to the supervision of the city. 
This court dealt with a similar situation in Cook v. 
Peter Kiewit Sons Co., 15 Utah 2d 20, 386 P.2d 616 (1963). 
In that case two construction companies were working 
jointly in a diversion tunnel at Flaming Gorge Dam. The 
plaintiff, an employee of one company, was doing work 
and received some directions from engineer employees of 
the defendant company. Plaintiff was injured, allegedly 
14 
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because of the negligence of the engineers. This court held 
that the plaintiff was in effect an employe of both the de-
fendant and the other company, and workmen's compensa-
tion was his exclusive remedy because both companies 
w0re regarded as the employing unit. 
In interpreting the language of Section 35-1-62, Utah 
Cod<' Annotated, (1953) i-iitpra, this court said at 617: 
"In approaching the question here presented 
it is well to keep in mind that the philosophy be-
hind the vVorkmen's Compensation Act encom-
passes two main objectives. The first is to assure 
that an employee who is injured in employment 
will have necessary medical and hospital care and 
modest but certain compensation for his injury, 
with resulting benefits to himself, his family and 
to society generally; the other is to afford employ-
ers a measure of protection against exorbitant 
claims for injuries." (Emphasis added.) 
This court then concluded at 617: 
"The language of the statute preserving an 
action against'* * * third persons' who are 'not in 
the same employment* * *'seems plainly designed 
to apply to strangers to the empoyment and not to 
co-workers jointly engaged in the same endeavor." 
(Emphasis added.) 
Similarly, in the recent case of Gallegos v. String-
ham, 21 Utah 2d 139, 442 P.2d 31 (1968), this court held 
that the plaintiff and defendant were in the same employ, 
so lJlaintiff's action \YaS barred by the exclusive remedy 
provisions of the '"T orkmen's Compensation Act. 
In Gallegos, defendant owned a dump truck and 
agreed to furnish it with a driver to a construction 
15 
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company. The defendant received $10.00 an hour for the 
truck and driver out of which he paid the driver. The con-
struction company maintained no employment records of 
the driver, but did control where he would drive, haul dirt 
an<l so on. While backing the truck, the driver injured an 
employee of the construction company. In holding that 
the driver and the injured person were in the same em-
ploy, the court based its decision on control of the con-
struction company over both the driver and the injured 
person. 
The architect and plaintiff in the instant case are in 
the similar situation of both working on the same en-
deavor, both subject to control by the same employer, and 
logically both limited to workmen's compensation as an 
exclusive remedy for injuries sustained. 
CONCLUSION 
Neither the contract nor the custom of the architects 
establishes a duty on the part of an architect to supervise 
the safety practices of a contractor or its employees. The 
duty of supervision owed by the architect encompasses 
only the supervision required to insure that the work 
progresses in accordance with the architectural plans. 
Architects, as all professionals, recognize their duty 
to properly design structures, and they honor this duty 
by supervising and inspecting the construction progress 
to insure compliance with the plans. If their duty is ex-
tended to encompass day-to-day safety practices of indi-
16 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
vidual workers only chaos can result because contractors 
will be unable to bid on or build structures without being 
subjected to the unpredictable requirements created by 
third parties. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, 
CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
ROBERT M. ANDERSON 
ROBERT D. MERRILL 
Amicus Curiae 
141 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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